
*Justice and the Awareness of Social Entities*¹

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Justice is, for the most part, what we think it is. Although thinking may seem to take a back seat to emotion in the turmoil of reactions to injustice, or to simple habit in the everyday enactment of just behavior, it is nevertheless true that features of our social environment can be partitioned as “just” or “unjust” only because we can think about them. With this idea as the guiding assumption, this chapter introduces a distinction between two principal ways in which the social world impinges on the person’s thoughts. First, just as the person might look *at* a distant light, the person may be *focally aware* of a social entity such as a person or a group. Second, just as the person might look *through* a telescope at the light, the person may be *tacitly aware* of social entities. This distinction makes it possible to characterize the person’s social awareness both in terms of what is focal (what social object is being thought about) and in terms of what is tacit (what social perspective is being used). The chapter offers an analysis of the consequences for justice that are observed when people think about others, themselves, and groups in these different ways.

I. TACIT AND FOCAL AWARENESS

One of the most remarkable features of human thought is that we know more than we can tell. This idea has reverberated through the

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history of philosophy and psychology—from the Kantian a priori to the Freudian unconscious—and serves in modern psychology as the foundation of the study of cognition (Franks, 1974; Turvey, 1974). In this view, the reported contents of conscious experience are the product of a variety of knowledge structures and cognitive processes, only some of which themselves may be reported. The larger portion of what we know remains hidden, inaccessible to conscious awareness and inspection. This hidden knowledge, however, is responsible for the appearance of what we *can* tell (Shallice, 1978). Just as creative insights appear in consciousness without an accompanying understanding of the processes by which they arose, the more mundane contents of everyday phenomenal experience appear—constituted, organized, and portrayed in awareness by an underlying body of cognitive process and structure.

This dichotomy—between conscious thoughts and the “deeper” cognitive processes that produce them—is reflected in two broad literatures in the field of cognitive social psychology. The impact of conscious thought has been studied in terms of “awareness” (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), “focalization” (Duval & Hensley, 1976), “mindfulness” (Langer, 1978), “salience and attention” (Taylor & Fiske, 1978), “time and thought” (Tesser, 1978), and so forth. The operation of the underlying structures of thought, in turn, has been identified in terms of “schemas” (Neisser, 1976; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Tesser, 1978), “construct systems” (Kelly, 1955), “implicit theories” (Wegner & Vallacher, 1977), “frames” (Minsky, 1975), “inferential sets” (Jones & Thibaut, 1958), and so on. It is with a view toward illuminating the fundamental interconnectedness of these two quite different mental systems that, in the present analysis, they are considered in terms of a special duality—*focal awareness* and *tacit awareness*.

A. An Instructive Metaphor

The concepts of focal and tacit awareness are perhaps most clearly grasped by means of a metaphor offered by Polanyi (1966). The metaphor consists of a person examining a cave with a stick. The cave is totally dark, and the person holds the stick in hand, using it to tap along the floor and walls. The peculiar aspect of this performance is that, although the sensation of the stick in hand may be noticeable at the beginning of the exploration, the way in which it touches the palm, moves against the fingers, and so on, very quickly drops from conscious awareness. Instead, one feels the point of the stick touching the walls, tapping the floor, slipping on water, pushing into earth, and otherwise sensing the cave. The awareness *of* the stick itself is changed upon re-

peated use to an awareness *of* the cave as experienced *through* the stick. The person who is using the stick as a sentient extension of the self, in terms of the present vocabulary, is focally aware of the cave and tacitly aware of the stick.

Three useful observations become available in further reflection on the metaphor. First, consider what would happen if different kinds of sticks were used. What if one employed a short stick, a rubber stick, or a sticky stick? To the person who had an opportunity to examine the particular stick being employed, these deviations from the standard household stick might not make much difference. But if the explorer were only tacitly aware of the stick, having never been allowed to manipulate the stick and understand its character, then the properties of each nonstandard stick would contribute to judgments of what the *cave* was like. The short stick would mean a larger cave, the rubber stick would find the cave especially spongy and giving, and the sticky stick would reveal a sticky cave. At the extreme, a stick with several bowling balls attached to the point might not find the cave at all. In short, then, the entities of which one is tacitly aware are wholly responsible for the appearance of focal entities.

The second observation suggested by the metaphor is a relatively simple one, but it is crucial for a correct understanding of tacit and focal awareness. Imagine that in the cave, one is very carefully poking the stick at every point along a wall. Intricate fissures are discovered, dangerous outcroppings become known, and as an even more intriguing feature of the wall is being explored, one steps past a drop-off and falls into a pond. For the lack of a few taps on the floor, an important feature of the environment has been missed. The moral here is obvious: One understands only that which is brought to focal awareness by way of tacit awareness. Those objects or events that are linked to the person by means of some tacit entity are given focal awareness, and in this way, are identified as entities themselves, are comprehended, and so are made the potential targets of evaluation and action.

The third observation provides the bridge between this metaphor and thought in general. Consider now what happens when one does not have a stick and explores the cave with one's hand alone. Extending the reasoning behind the original definitions, it seems that one must be tacitly aware of one's hand to be focally aware of the cave. As a generalization of this idea, Polanyi (1969) suggests that focal awareness of objects is produced by tacit awareness of the body; we become aware *of* objects only by being aware *through* the sense receptors and interpretation systems of the body. The stick, as a tacit extension of the body, serves as a concrete example of a multiplicity of potential tacit extensions. These

range from other concrete objects used as tools for the direction of focal awareness to the more abstract systems of cognition and perception by which the mind directs focal awareness in the same way.

B. The Tacit-Focal Function

The translation of this metaphor into a useful model of social cognition begins with the realization that awareness of the social environment has a directed, vector-like quality. One does not merely perceive or attend to aspects of the social environment; rather, such focal awareness is always directed through a tacit awareness system in which focal entities are given their identifiability, meaning, and value. So, for a conscious thought or percept to occur, there must exist a tacit awareness system through which it may be brought into focal awareness. This characterization of the production of consciousness can be summarized in this way: *Tacit awareness supplies the dimensions and metrics by which entities given focal awareness are constituted, comprehended, and evaluated.* This general rule may be called the tacit-focal function.

Interpreted at a basic level, this function merely asserts that one must know both what is tacit and what is focal for the nature of a percept to be specified. In the *constitution* of entities, tacit awareness lets us become focally aware of "things"; the flow of experience is partitioned into units, identifiable as separate from the remaining body of experience. Actions and events are constituted from the temporal flow (Newson, 1976), people and groups are constituted as entities from the field of social experience (Heider, 1958), and more generally, things are constituted through the differentiation and integration of experience (Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). For anything like this to occur, the experience must be given focal awareness. Phenomenologists such as Schutz (1967) have long recognized that conscious awareness of experience leads to "objectification" in this way, but have not appreciated the role of tacit awareness in the process. Quite simply, it is tacit awareness that provides the specifications whereby constitution is carried out. The constitution of focal entities occurs when tacit awareness suggests what should and should not be included in the definition of each entity.

Focal and tacit awareness are similarly interdependent in the *comprehension* of experience. Entities that appear in focal awareness are comprehended in the sense that they are located in a tacit mental system of other entities; they may be categorized, given a dimensional representation, placed in a semantic network, or simply imaged. In any of these mental systems, the focal entity becomes linked with other entities and is thereby given meaning in relation to them (Wegner, 1977). So,

situations that are lent focal awareness have more compelling implications for our behavior (Langer, 1978); emotions to which our focal awareness is drawn are felt more strongly (Scheier & Carver, 1977); the agents we pay special attention are seen to have greater causal efficacy (Duval & Hensley, 1976). These effects occur not only because of the presence of focal awareness, but also because of the specific tacit systems that are engaged. Just as the sentence context within which a word is perceived may determine the word's meaning, the particular tacit system that serves as a link to focal awareness determines the nature of the comprehended focal entity.

The most critical aspect of comprehension is *evaluation*, and it is affected by the tacit-focal function in a similar way. First, the dimensions, standards, or values by which an entity is evaluated are components of the tacit system; for this reason, the contents of tacit awareness will determine whether any focal entity is seen as good or bad. Second, the extent to which an entity is subject to *any* evaluation suggested by the tacit system is dependent on the extent to which the entity is given focal awareness. Focal awareness of oneself, for instance, seems necessary for the onset of self-evaluation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). And more generally, Tesser (1978) has shown that thinking carefully (and hence, focally) about anything tends to polarize one's attitudes toward that topic of thought.

To summarize these ideas about the tacit-focal function, it is helpful to return to the cave for some illumination. Suppose that one is poking the stick at a particular spot on the floor. The tacit-focal function says that the spot will be constituted ("here's something"), comprehended ("this seems to be a drop-off"), and evaluated ("I'd rather not be put on the spot, thanks"). And, because of the interdependence of tacit and focal awareness suggested by the function, it can also be said that (a) the particular focal spot is known (constituted, etc.), whereas other (non-focal) spots are not known; and (b) the particular tacit stick determines how the spot is known, in a way that other tacit sticks might not. In short, every act of cognition is specifiable in terms of two features: What is tacit and what is focal.

C. The Awareness of Social Entities

The tacit-focal function provides an appealing way of expressing how people are represented in our thoughts. To begin with, it seems obvious that people—specific others, groups, and even oneself—can be objects of focal awareness. We can think about these entities, categorize and evaluate them, and otherwise consider them in consciousness. A more

subtle but equally important idea is that we may be tacitly aware of such social entities. That one may be tacitly aware of oneself, of course, follows from Polanyi's (1969) observation that one can only see the world (or the cave) *through* oneself. But in a wide range of instances of social cognition, it seems we also use cognitive constructions of other people and groups in this way. When our attention is directed toward the sky by a crowd looking upward, for example, or when our attention is moved to a stubborn soft-drink machine by a person doing battle with it, we are using knowledge of these people as an instrument that guides our focal awareness beyond the people themselves to their situations. In this sense, we may be tacitly aware of others.

This line of reasoning suggests that a useful analysis of social cognition can be made by considering separately each of the major ways in which a person may be aware of a social entity (cf. Wegner & Giuliano, 1982). An outline of these forms of social awareness, partitioned in terms of tacit versus focal awareness of self, of a specific other, and of a group, is presented in Table 3.1. Each of these forms of social awareness may be considered a "state" of the person's awareness because each portrays the particular form that cognitive processing may take for an instance of social cognitive activity of indeterminate duration. Each is also viewable as an extension of the tacit self; because one invariably takes one's own perspective as the starting point for any other form of awareness, the self is always in the most basic tacit position across the forms of awareness.

As will be seen in upcoming sections of this chapter, these forms of awareness hold certain features in common with conceptions introduced in both the early and recent history of social psychology. Tacit self awareness, for example, is similar in some aspects to the "natural attitude" of phenomenology (e.g., Schutz, 1967) and to Duval and

Wicklund's (1972) "subjective self awareness." Focal self awareness, in turn, may be seen as a variant on Duval and Wicklund's "objective self awareness" and on the several early phenomenological and symbolic interactionist treatments of the reflective "social self" (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Schutz, 1967). Continuing through the tabled awareness forms, it can be noted that tacit other awareness corresponds in some ways with "empathy" (e.g., Stotland, 1969), "role-taking" (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968), and the phenomenal state of "intersubjectivity" (Schutz, 1967), whereas focal other awareness is reminiscent of Heider's (1958) suggestions regarding the state of mind necessary for the construction of people as phenomenal objects. Finally, the forms of group awareness can be seen together in Cooley's (1902) ideas about "we-feeling," and are differentiated into both focal and tacit forms in Holzner's (1978) arguments on the phenomenal representation of groups as objects versus subjects. Although a knowledge of this rich history is helpful for understanding the forms of social awareness, it is not crucial, as the key aspects of all of these traditions appear to be well characterized by the tacit-focal function.

These six forms of the awareness of social entities are only the elements of an even more complex system. It can be suggested, for example, that one could be tacitly aware of a group while holding a particular person in focal awareness; this sort of thing could occur when, for example, one's carload of compatriots is delayed on the way to an important event by a heedless, foot-shuffling pedestrian. Alternatively, one might be focally aware of oneself through tacit awareness of a specific other; the state of consciousness that ensues when one commits an indelicacy under the gaze of a haughty waiter is an example. This soon-dizzying array of combinations is limited in two ways. First, there are rules of combination that indicate which forms of awareness are "grammatical."² Second, there is the even more severe pragmatic limitation of the capacity of the human mind for tacit extension. Because one does not make many sensible judgments when asked to take a perspective on a perspective on a perspective on an object, it seems reasonable to assume that this limitation is quite stringent. Although the entire set of combined awareness forms that may exist under these limitations are of potential interest, the elemental forms presented in the table are of prime interest, and therefore they will be considered in greatest depth.

²The combination rules may be specified in this way: (a) Any form of social awareness consists of a string; (b) the string begins with tacit awareness of self; (c) the string continues with tacit awareness of an ordered array of social entities numbering zero or more; and (d) the string ends with focal awareness of a single entity or with focal awareness of the situation of the most recent entity in tacit awareness.

Table 3.1
Forms of Social Awareness

Awareness form	Position of social entity	
	Tacit	Focal
Tacit self awareness	Self	Self's situation
Focal self awareness	Self	Self
Tacit other awareness	Self, other	Other's situation
Focal other awareness	Self	Other
Tacit group awareness	Self, group	Group's situation
Focal group awareness	Self	Group

D. Awareness and Justice

It is the general thesis of this chapter that a perceiver's form of awareness determines what is seen as just. In this regard, the present view shares certain assumptions with previous treatments of justice as a system of social cognition (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976; Selman & Damon, 1975) and social evaluation (e.g., Feinberg, 1970; Pettigrew, 1967; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). That justice is dependent on what one understands about a social exchange, that it operates on a complex set of variables only some of which are seen as relevant to any particular exchange, and that it results both in the evaluation of persons and in the evaluation of their situations, for instance, are propositions derivable from these writings. The special contribution of the present approach is the tacit-focal function.

The tacit-focal function specifies that tacit awareness supplies the dimensions on which evaluation is accomplished, whereas focal awareness contains the target of the evaluation. When questions of justice, fairness, or deserving are posed, it is likely that they will be answered by a perceiver only by reference to the immediately available contents of these two systems. If one is tacitly aware of another person, for instance, and is asked what this person deserves, the person's situation is focal and it is the situation that will be evaluated; this evaluation will be carried out on the basis of dimensions supplied by tacit awareness of the person. If one is focally aware of the person, however, and the question of deserving is raised, then the person will be evaluated with respect to dimensions supplied by the self's tacit system. The rule underlying this case can be extended from other awareness to self-awareness and group awareness as well. In each case, tacit awareness of a social entity (self, other, or group) leads to an evaluation of the entity's situation, while focal awareness of the entity leads to an evaluation of the entity. These different kinds of evaluation contribute to decisions about what is just in different ways.

Tacit awareness of a social entity (self, other, or group) produces an orientation toward the needs of the entity; the entity's situation is evaluated in focal awareness in terms of its provision of those needs. This proposition acknowledges that the tacit evaluation system held by any social entity is likely to evaluate focal contents in terms of their hedonic consequences for the tacit entity. When in a state of tacit self awareness, for instance, one inspects the focal environment with a view toward the satisfaction of simple self-interest; focal entities are good or bad only when they are good or bad for self. When tacit awareness of others or of groups is overlaid on tacit self awareness, the focal situations of these entities are evaluated with respect to their satisfaction of the needs and interests of the tacit other or group. A concern for one's social responsibility (Ber-

kowitz, 1972) or for the allocation of resources according to need (Lerner, 1975; Leventhal, 1976) is likely to be felt. In sum, to the degree that tacit awareness of a social entity is engaged, what the entity *deserves* is calculated according to what the entity *wants*.

Focal awareness of a social entity (self, other, or group) produces an orientation toward the evaluation of the entity; the entity is evaluated in focal awareness in terms of standards that serve the interests of the tacit system that is engaged. This principle reiterates the tacit-focal function, but in such a way that a second major relationship between awareness forms and justice can be discerned. The idea that social entities may be evaluated in focal awareness with respect to their adherence to standards that are in the interest of (tacit) others allows for the operation of a contribution rule in the judgment of what is fair. The broad precept that "you get what you pay for," as embodied in exchange rules such as the personal contract and social contract (Lerner, 1975), the equity norm (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973), the reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 1960), or the contribution rule (Leventhal, 1976), becomes available as a means of calculating deserving when social entities occupy focal awareness because the interests of most tacit entities are met by the regular application of such a rule. In sum, to the degree that focal awareness of a social entity is engaged, what the entity *deserves* is calculated according to what the entity *earns*.

These two propositions, one relating tacit awareness to a need rule and the other linking focal awareness with a contribution rule, provide a useful way of representing much of what is known about the interface of justice and social cognition. The idea that different distribution tactics may be used in different interpersonal settings, a common one in justice theory (Lerner *et al.*, 1976; Leventhal, 1976), is captured by these propositions when it is recognized that different interpersonal settings may instigate different predominant awareness forms. The ascription of variations in justice strategies to developmental changes or individual differences (Gunzburger, Wegner, & Anoushian, 1977), in turn, may be traced to variations in the propensity or capacity to adopt the different awareness forms. In the following sections, both situational and individual difference determinants of specific awareness forms are mapped in greater detail, and the evidence on the proposed relationship between each awareness form and justice is explored.

II. AWARENESS OF THE OTHER

The observation that others may be comprehended not only as objects in the world but also as subjects through which the world may be viewed

is an old one in social theory (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Schutz, 1967). The features of this distinction emphasized in such early treatments remain essentially intact when they are formalized in terms of the tacit-focal function. Focal other awareness corresponds to viewing the particular other as a social object or entity; the other is focalized as a means of understanding his or her status as a responsible human agent who has potential impact on the tacit self. Tacit other awareness, in contrast, corresponds to seeing the other's environment from the perspective of a tacit cognitive construction of the other's subjective stance; the other's situation is focalized as a means of understanding his or her actions, motives, and goals.

A. Focal Other Awareness

1. DETERMINANTS

The tendency to hold others in focal awareness is a pervasive one in mental life. In the stream of an observer's experience, another person appears as a stricture or "bottleneck" in the flow; prior events act as causes in changing the person, and then in complex and often unanticipated ways, the person acts as an "origin" of further changes and events in the environment (Heider, 1944). For this reason, and because the behaviors of others may often have hedonic consequences for the observer, others are constituted in the observer's focal awareness as meaningful entities that may be judged, compared, categorized, and evaluated. Focal other awareness, like the "value maintenance set" described by Jones and Thibaut (1958), is aroused by the perceiver's needs to understand and control the impingements of the social world on the self.

In large part, the study of person perception in social psychology is the study of how persons are perceived in focal other awareness. When observers report on the traits of a person, evaluate the person, judge the person's physical or mental qualities, or otherwise ascribe properties to the person as an entity, focal awareness of the person is necessary. The other is seen as an entity whose features and attributes are (at least for the moment) static and identifiable, and to whom responsibility for behavior and events may be directly attributed. This close correspondence between focal other awareness and personal attribution of causality to the other is the basis for an important general rule. Because focal other awareness is the necessary precursor to such personal attribution, it can be said that many of the determinants of personal attribution may operate as such only because of their impact on focal other awareness.

Examining previous research and theory with this rule in mind, a range of variables can be isolated that are likely instigators of focal other awareness. Personal attributions often result, for example, when the observer lacks knowledge of the other's situation (Kelley, 1967), when the other is perceptually salient (McArthur & Post, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978), when the other is seen as very unlike the self (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), or when the other's actions have hedonic relevance for self (Jones & Davis, 1965). Although attribution theory has not provided any framework within which all of these determinants might find unitary representation, the tacit-focal function makes their internal coherence quite clear. It is reasonable that focal other awareness (and hence, personal attribution) should occur (a) when the other is difficult to know tacitly because his or her situation is unknown; (b) when the other's status as an object of perception and conscious thought is made salient; (c) when the other is seen as sufficiently different from self that tacit awareness of the other is precluded; and (d) when the other is highly relevant to the well-being of the tacit self. In broad outline, then, these are the properties of interpersonal settings that introduce focal other awareness.

2. CONSEQUENCES FOR PERSON EVALUATION AND ATTITUDE INFERENCE

According to the justice propositions developed earlier (Section I. D.), the evaluation of the other that occurs in focal other-awareness is carried out with reference to rules or standards of social exchange fairness. A focal other who makes an input appropriate to the level of outcome that is received will be evaluated positively, whereas one who obtains outcomes disproportionately higher or lower than inputs will be evaluated negatively. Because most social psychological studies of person perception are conducted under conditions likely to induce focal other awareness in observers, it is not surprising to find that results consistent with these predictions have been reported frequently in the person perception and justice literature (see, e.g., reviews by Austin, Walster, & Utne, 1976; Leventhal, 1976.)³

Perhaps the best known illustration of the impact of focal other awareness on justice and evaluation is the "just world phenomenon" (Lerner, 1971; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). This phenomenon was observed when Lerner and Simmons (1966) asked

³The highly selective citation of such research in this section is undertaken because for the particular studies cited, there exists complementary research demonstrating how observers' evaluations and inferences change when they are tacitly aware of others. These studies are taken up in Section II. B. 2.

observer-subjects to give their evaluations of a target person who underwent a series of painful electric shocks. As compared to evaluations of a person who did not receive shocks, these evaluations were decidedly negative. Because such derogation of the victim does not obtain when the victim is given proper monetary compensation for the pain and suffering (Lerner, 1971), it appears that negative evaluation during focal other awareness occurred only when the other received the shocks in an *unfair* exchange. When a balance between input (shock reception) and outcome (monetary compensation) was maintained, evaluations of the victim were no longer negative and even became slightly positive.

That the evaluation of focal others becomes negative not only when they are victims of unfair exchanges, but also when they benefit from such interactions is shown in an experiment by Alexander and Knight (1971). These researchers conducted an observer simulation of the classic cognitive dissonance experiment by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). Observer-subjects listened to an audio tape of an actor-subject who agreed to perform a task in exchange for money. The task varied in pleasantness for different observers; for some, the actor was heard to perform the relatively pleasant task of telling the truth (i.e., advocating participation in the experiment when he believed the experiment was fun), whereas for others, the actor was heard to perform the unpleasant task of lying (i.e., advocating participation in the experiment when he believed it was boring). The monetary compensation given the actor also varied for different observers from a low of \$1 to a high of \$20.

It would be expected that under the prevailing state of focal other awareness, observers would evaluate positively the actor who did the unpleasant task for high compensation, as well as the actor who did the pleasant task for low compensation, because in both cases the actor engaged in a fair exchange with contribution proportional to compensation. This is indeed what was found, as those conditions representing the "reverse incentive" effect resulted in positive actor evaluation. The conditions representing "incentive" effects, in turn, would be expected to yield negative actor evaluations, and this also was found. When the actor performed an unpleasant task for low compensation, like the shock recipient in Lerner and Simmons's (1966) research, he was disliked. When the actor performed a pleasant task for high compensation, reaping an unfair benefit by obtaining positive outcomes at little expense, he was also disliked. In short, adherence to the contribution rule produced positive evaluations, whereas deviations from such a rule resulted in negative evaluations.

This reinterpretation of the Alexander and Knight data holds special

appeal because it suggests a new way to conceptualize the reverse incentive effect—the central phenomenon of dissonance, self-perception, and intrinsic motivation research. The reverse incentive is portrayed in this light as a justice phenomenon. The attitude inferences that observers make in Bemian simulations (Bem, 1967, 1972) may simply be the result of the expectation that a focal other will be fair. When the actor receives a large amount of money for doing a task (e.g., \$20), observers infer that the actor's input must have been substantial and that the task was thus a tedious one; when the actor receives little compensation for doing the task (e.g., \$1), observers infer that the task must have been an easy one requiring little input. Attitude inferences observers make about the actor reflect these justice considerations, and task enjoyment is found to be related to incentive magnitude in a reverse manner.

Focal awareness of another person, as described here, is a state in which observers evaluate the other according to a contribution rule of social exchange, and make attitude inferences about the other on the basis of that rule as well. The possibility that this inference structure changes dramatically when tacit other awareness is adopted is the topic of the next section.

B. Tacit Other Awareness

1. DETERMINANTS

Conceptualized as empathy (Hoffman, 1976; Wegner, 1980), role taking (Flavell *et al.*, 1968), or perspective taking (Selman, 1976; Selman & Damon, 1975), tacit other awareness has been treated as a developmental variable in many previous frameworks. Though focal other awareness may also depend on cognitive abilities that mature with development, it is fair to say that tacit other awareness depends on a somewhat more complex set of abilities and hence appears even later in development. The capacity to entertain thoughts about a situation from the tacit viewpoint of another person may vary among individual adult observers, then, as a result of differential levels of cognitive maturation. Even so, it is likely that adults normally have the capacity for both tacit and focal other awareness and that fluctuations between states are in large part determined by situational variables.

The situational determinants of tacit other awareness can be identified broadly as the complements of factors that increase focal other awareness. Tacit other awareness would be expected to ensue to the extent that (a) the other's situation is clear and salient; (b) the other's status as an object of perception and thought is not salient; (c) the other

is seen as similar to the self; and (d) the other's actions are not detrimental to the well-being of the tacit self. An increase in attribution of the other's behavior to situational factors—a central indicant of tacit other awareness—has been observed in a variety of studies manipulating one or more of these factors (e.g., Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Perhaps most commonly, however, researchers have manipulated this awareness form by taking advantage of observers' ability to secure conscious control of it in response to instructional sets. In some studies, observers have been told that they would shortly be taking the role of the actor themselves (e.g., Wolfson & Salancik, 1977); in others, they have been given direct instructions to empathize with the actor (e.g., Gould & Sigall, 1977; Regan & Totten, 1975; Stotland, 1969; Wegner & Finstuen, 1977); in yet others, they have been instructed to read a story from a particular person's point of view (e.g., Pichert & Anderson, 1977). The results of these manipulations generally seem to parallel those that would be expected to occur in response to the naturally occurring environmental influences previously listed.

CONSEQUENCES FOR TUA¹ ATTITUDE INFERENC

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The initial consequence of tacit other awareness is that the other is *not* evaluated. The other is used merely as a cue to direct focal awareness toward his or her situation, and so the other escapes accountability for behavior and events. This point is well made in a study of the "just world" effect by Aderman, Brehm, and Katz (1974). These researchers gave empathy instructions to observers who then witnessed the experience of an innocent victim receiving shocks. Although subjects who were not given special instructions derogated the victim in this setting—replicating Lerner and Simmons's (1966) original demonstration—those subjects given empathy instructions did not engage in such derogation. Rather than condemning the victim for participating in an unjust exchange, they remained neutral. Such "leniency" has been found to characterize empathic observers in a number of other studies (e.g., Archer, Foushee, Davis, & Aderman, 1979), and may be considered a central property of tacit other awareness.

The state of tacit other awareness leads the observer to evaluate the other's situation with reference to the other's needs and goals. When an observer reads a story with the perspective of a particular person in mind, for example, the story information relevant to the person's goals is given greater attention and rehearsal for memory (Pichert & Anderson, 1977) and the person's feelings and need states are more often considered (Bower, 1978). Observers instructed to empathize with live or

filmed others are also likely to attend to need states (Stotland, 1969) and situational factors (Regan & Totten, 1975). And it is well documented that tacit other awareness (induced through instructions or through manipulated perceptions of similarity) can increase an observer's behavioral responsiveness to the other's needs (Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Krebs, 1975). In tacit other awareness, justice is served when a "good" situation is encountered and the other's needs are thereby met; for this reason, tacit other awareness should often lead observers to opt for a need-based allocation of resources to the other.

Some further insight into the inference processes that accompany tacit other awareness can be gained by considering again the judgments observers make in the Bemian simulation of the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) cognitive dissonance study (cf. Section II. A. 2.). If it is true that observers who adopt tacit other awareness of an actor forego the social exchange evaluation of the actor for a need-based evaluation of the actor's situation, it is possible to predict that observers in such a state would make attitude inferences in line with an incentive effect. When these observers find that an actor obtains \$20 for doing a task, as opposed to \$1 for doing the task, they should infer that greater subjective need gratification has been achieved by the actor. Hence, when asked how much the actor liked the task, they should evaluate the task—a part of the actor's situation—as more positive with increasing amounts of money. Findings precisely in line with this expectation have been reported by Wegner and Finstuen (1977); observers given empathy instructions made inferences about actor enjoyment of the task that varied directly with incentive magnitude.

The summary implication of this discussion of focal and tacit other awareness is this: To the degree that one is focally aware of another, the other's joys are seen as paid for with sorrows and the other is disappointed if this is not so; but to the extent that one is tacitly aware of another, the other's joy is held as a goal and the other's situation is esteemed when this goal is fulfilled.

III. AWARENESS OF THE SELF

Like the forms of other awareness, the forms of self awareness are traceable to an array of early philosophical and psychological frameworks. But unlike other awareness, the topic of self awareness has achieved current prominence in a major social psychological theory—the theory of objective self awareness proposed by Duval and Wicklund (1972). These theorists suggest that individuals spend some moments in

an outward-focused state of attention (subjective self awareness) and others in a reflective state (objective self awareness). During objective self-awareness, the individual becomes acutely aware of a salient discrepancy between behavior and a standard for behavior, and feels a negative or positive affective state as a result of the direction of this discrepancy (Wicklund, 1975). The implications of this motivational system for action are clear: If the discrepancy is positive, the person attempts to approach or remain in the state of objective self awareness, whereas if the discrepancy is negative, the person attempts either to avoid the self-focused state or to reduce the discrepancy through action or attitude change. These ideas have been supported by a sizable body of research (see reviews by Wicklund, 1979a,b; Wicklund & Frey, 1980), and are essentially compatible with the present analysis. In the main, the present concepts of focal and tacit self awareness can be equated with objective and subjective self awareness, respectively.

More than a simple renaming, this conceptualization of self awareness in terms of the tacit-focal function provides a useful supplement to the original theory in two ways. First, by considering subjective self awareness as a state in which the person is tacitly aware of self, it becomes possible to make suggestions about what may guide behavior in this state; although objective self awareness theory has little to say about this problem, the tacit-focal function offers the suggestion that self-interest should serve as the primary goal to action in tacit self awareness. Second, the present formulation also helps to clarify how the source of particular standards adhered to in the objective or focal self awareness state may be specified; quite simply, the tacit-focal function indicates that evaluation of self in focal self awareness takes place with regard to standards that serve the interest of whatever social entity is held in tacit awareness. This idea allows for the expansion of self awareness notions to include the processes of self-presentation and impression management. These amplifications of the conception of self awareness are taken up in turn in this section.

A. Tacit Self Awareness and Self-Interest

Tacit self awareness is the most basic form of social entity awareness in two senses. First, echoing the point made by Polanyi (1969), one is focally or tacitly aware of environmental objects, persons, or groups, only by being tacitly aware of oneself. Because this awareness form is the first knowledge system in a chain of systems that may have several links, it is always engaged as a prelude to the activation of the other systems;

and thus is basic in this structural sense. Only when tacit or focal awareness of some social entity serves the interests of the tacit self will another form of awareness be assumed. The second way in which tacit self awareness is fundamental becomes apparent in thinking about the maturation of the human being. Because self-reflection is not in the province of very young children (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Selman, 1976), or for that matter of most animals (Gallup, 1977), the state of tacit self awareness is closer to the biological givens of the organism and is basic in a developmental sense.

Tacit self-awareness in its "pure" form—without tacit or focal awareness of other social entities appended—occurs when the individual focuses on activities, tasks, or environmental objects. Performing a repetitive or rhythmic task (Duval & Wicklund, 1973), for example, or becoming involved in automatic (Kimble & Perlmutter, 1970) or over-learned behavior (Langer, 1978; Wicklund & Frey, 1980) is likely to arouse this awareness form. It is under these conditions that the person is most likely to scan the environment and operate on it according to the dictates of simple self-interest; those activities or objects that promise the gratification of needs are approached, whereas those that threaten the continued gratification of needs are avoided. This sort of situational "guidance system" is evident even in animals and infants, and may occur without any form of social self-reflection (cf. Vallacher, Wegner, & Hoine, 1980).

It is during the state of tacit self awareness that the individual evaluates the environment in terms of the self-satisfactions it may provide. So, like the attitude inferences that are made when one is tacitly aware of another, the estimates of one's own attitude offered during tacit self-awareness are likely to reflect the operation of an incentive effect. Situations that hold appreciable rewards or satisfactions are valued, whereas those that yield lower levels of reward are not. Evidence in favor of this reasoning is available in several studies of the effect of monetary compensation on task enjoyment. Experiments by Crano and Messé (1970) and Rosenberg (1965), for example, both may be interpreted in such terms. Subjects in these studies were asked to write a counterattitudinal essay in exchange for payment, and then were engaged for some time in absorbing tasks that quite likely promoted tacit self awareness (i.e., walking and drawing, respectively). Subjects' attitudes on the essay topic reported following these activities were consistent with an incentive interpretation; the more money they were paid, the more they agreed with their essays. Because agreement with a self-generated essay is a measure of the perceived enjoyment of writing it (Kruglanski, 1975),

both of these studies indicate that, among tacitly self aware subjects, increased levels of need satisfaction were linked to increments in task enjoyment.

The direct covariation of enjoyment with incentive in tacit self awareness holds implications for an array of justice-related behaviors. A person in this state would be more likely to follow the dictates of self-interest in allocating rewards among members of a group; and when performance is measured, a person aware of self in this way should work hard to the extent that rewards for self are in view. The everyday examples of persons who, momentarily or chronically, are too busy, too distracted, or too absorbed in their own pursuits to consider the fairness of their actions are many. Unbridled by concerns for others or for the evaluation of self, the person in tacit self awareness is inclined toward greed.

B. Focal Self Awareness and Justice

One may become focally aware of oneself in a variety of ways. Research in the objective self awareness tradition of Duval and Wicklund (1972) has most often induced this state in the experimental subject by exposing the subject to his or her own mirror image. But other self-focusing stimuli such as a camera (e.g., Vallacher, 1978), audience (e.g., Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974), self-description task (e.g., Duval, Duval, & Neely, 1979), or playback of one's own tape-recorded voice (e.g., Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976) or video image (e.g., Duval & Hensley, 1976) have been used to invoke the state, and a measure of the dispositional propensity toward "private self-consciousness" (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) has been devised that holds promise as a measure of the same construct (Carver & Scheier, 1978). The assumption underlying all of these strategies for manipulating self-focus is that when a person is reminded in some way about the status of self as an object of attention and evaluation, the person will come to consider the self as a focal object in other ways as well. The further proposition offered by the present analysis is that focal self awareness produced by these or other means in justice-relevant settings sets off an evaluation of self in terms of the contribution rule.

TASK ENJOYMENT AND SELF ATTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDE

To round out the discussion of task enjoyment and attitude inference that has been broached at several points previously, it can be proposed

that the person in a state of focal self awareness will regularly calculate his or her own enjoyment of tasks in line with a reverse incentive effect. Because the self may be evaluated positively in this state only when one's contribution is proportional to one's compensation, it is likely that individuals given a certain level of compensation will compute the magnitude of their contribution to maintain a positive self-view. Given a large amount of money for doing a task or delivering an essay, the person in this state should infer that the task was difficult or that the essay was a lie and hence was difficult to deliver. Given little money for these tasks, the person in this state should assume that the task was easy or that the essay was consistent with his or her own attitudes.

Unfortunately, experimental evidence bearing on these propositions is sparse. Although Wicklund and Duval (1971, Experiment 2) found that subjects who were paid nothing for writing a counterattitudinal essay reported attitudes more in line with the essay when they were made self aware by means of a mirror, no reward magnitude variation was included in the experiment, so no conclusions regarding the proposed relation between focal self awareness and the reverse incentive effect can be drawn. It is possible to suggest, however, that many of the dissonance and self-perception studies that have yielded evidence of reverse incentive phenomena were conducted under conditions in which subjects were in the state of focal self awareness. The reverse incentive effect is most often observed when subjects are led to believe that they have complete choice in deciding whether or not to engage in the exchange of reward for work (see, e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, & Hays, 1978). When personal responsibility is accepted in this way, some reflection on self as a focal social entity is necessary (cf. Hampshire, 1960). So, it may be that the many instances of the overjustification or reverse incentive effect (see Lepper & Greene, 1978; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) occur because responsibility acceptance invokes focal self awareness and its associated inference system based on the contribution rule.

2. PERFORMANCE AND REWARD ALLOCATION

Several studies have examined the connection between focal self awareness and justice very directly. Gibbons, Wicklund, Karylowski, Rosenfield, and Chase (1978, Experiment 5), for instance, arranged for subjects who had either been overpaid or equitably paid by an experimenter for doing a task to have a chance to compensate the experimenter by working for a longer time. Whereas subjects given no special treatment to induce focal self awareness did not engage in more work when they had been overpaid, subjects made self-attentive by means of a

mirror did restore equity in this way. Parallel findings have been observed in a similar study by Reis and Burns (cited in Reis, 1978). When subjects were either equitably paid or overpaid to perform a proofreading task, overpaid subjects who did the task in the presence of a mirror completed more work than did those who performed the task without a mirror. At the same time, however, the mirror subjects also made more errors, suggesting that they were fervently trying to get more work done.

Reward allocation as a function of self-focused attention has been studied by Greenberg (1980). Subjects in this study were presented with the problem of allocating payment to themselves and another participant for performance on a task; performance was (ostensibly) either chance determined or contingent on the participants' behavior, and subjects were told that they performed better than, more poorly than, or the same as did their partners. While some subjects made their allocation decision in the presence of a mirror, others made the decision without this self-focusing device. In both mirror and no-mirror conditions, allocations made to self and other were essentially equal when performance was chance determined; but when performance differences reflected behavioral input differences between participants, subjects in both mirror and no-mirror conditions allocated reward according to equity. What is especially noteworthy about these results is that, in the latter conditions, mirror subjects were more equitable than were no-mirror subjects, apparently taking the differential levels of input more completely into account in their allocation decisions. This finding is accompanied by another interesting result: In answers to a postexperimental questionnaire, mirror subjects expressed greater concern than did no-mirror subjects about the appropriateness of their allocations.

Although the research on the connection between self-focused attention and justice is just beginning, it seems that there is already firm evidence indicating that self-focus results in behavior designed to adhere to a contribution or equity rule. Subjects made focally self aware through mirror presence increase their performance on tasks when this would serve equity and divide rewards between self and other in an equitable fashion as well. A special caveat should be noted here, though, in the service of completeness. The present framework coincides with Duval and Wicklund's theory in noting that a frequent and sometimes prepotent response to self-focused attention is flight from the self-focusing stimulus. Because the self-evaluation that ensues from failure to meet the equity standard is phenomenally aversive, individuals in a state of focal self awareness may often be guided by their tacit interest in avoiding such displeasure to escape from the self-focusing setting. This escape may disrupt or preclude attempts to be equitable.

Tacit Perspectives and Self-Presentation

A recurrent issue in writings on the self is the extent to which the self is a stable aspect of the person. The idea that the self is typically a mutable and transient reflection of the person's immediate social situation, although somewhat antithetical to theories of self-concept or self awareness, has gained currency in social psychological treatments of self-presentation (e.g., Arkin, 1980), impression management (e.g., Tedeschi & Linskold, 1976), and situated identities (e.g., Alexander & Knight, 1971). Each of these frameworks suggests that people may behave in social settings not to be consistent with an internalized set of values or standards—a "true" self—but rather to be consistent with the values or expectations of others.

As a psychological theory, this view is incomplete. It fails to specify any intrapersonal mechanism whereby the translation of others' expectations, or even the social definition of the situation, might be conveyed into the individual's understanding and behavior. To some extent, this difficulty is remedied by the recent attempts of self awareness theorists to incorporate "fleeting," social standards into their representations of the self-awareness processes. Wicklund and Frey (1980), for instance, have argued that self-focus produces adherence to rules one has most recently acted upon, whereas Hull and Levy (1979) have proposed that self-attention may generally sensitize the person to self-relevant social cues. Within the tacit-focal framework, however, it is possible to provide a resolution of even greater parsimony. Both the stable and variable aspects of self-evaluation can be represented when it is recognized that a person may become focally aware of self either through the (stable) tacit self or through the (variable) tacit awareness of specific others or groups.

1. TACIT PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOCAL SELF

As a first step in considering the different tacit views from which the self may be focalized, it is useful to specify in some greater detail the nature of simple focal self awareness—the state in which the person regards the focal self from the perspective of the tacit self (see Table 3.1). The point to be made about this form of awareness, and to be generalized to the other forms of awareness, is that the individual in this state comes to view the self as a *person*. When the individual reflects on self as a nonsocial entity—by attending to cognitive activities (Flavell & Wellman, 1977), for example, or to physical sensations or bodily states (Pennebaker & Skelton, 1978)—particular aspects of the functioning of self may be focalized and processes of self-regulation may be engaged (Carver, 1979). But in these cases, the tacit perspective does not necessar-

ily constitute the self as a person, a responsible human agent in the field of other social entities. It is only when the tacit self constitutes, comprehends, and evaluates the focal self as a person that considerations of fairness and equity are brought to the fore. Under these conditions, self-focused attention can be analyzed as a form of social entity awareness.

This argument holds certain key aspects in common with the early theoretical propositions of Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934). These theorists suggested that, in development, the individual moves beyond an egocentric perspective only by first taking the perspectives of others and thereby viewing the self as a focal object. As the result of taking many different perspectives on the focal self, then, the individual is said to develop a cognitive construction of the "generalized other" that is invoked later when self-reflection occurs without the presence of specific others. In essence, the function attributed to the generalized other by these theorists is the same function ascribed here to the tacit self. When the tacit self constitutes the focal self as a person, the concept of "person" serves to guide the evaluation of the focal self in terms of properties (e.g., fairness) that are relevant to the evaluation of persons in general. Just as the tacit self prescribes the evaluation of focal others in terms of their worth as persons, it employs a "person" template in assessing the properties of the focal self. When manipulations of self-focused attention highlight the uniquely "social" aspects of the person (e.g., the face in the mirror or video monitor, the voice, the fact that one is viewed by others, etc.), it can be expected that self-evaluation of exchange fairness will ensue.

In looking beyond the typical experimental manipulations of self-focus, it seems that there are many instances in which one's status as a social entity could be made salient in even more subtle ways. When one's behavior is known to others, for example, or when one's attitudes are made evident to them, an impetus toward viewing oneself as a responsible human agent could be experienced. In these cases, the direct attention of others toward oneself might not even be necessary to induce focal self awareness; knowledge that others might have occasion to turn their attention and evaluation toward oneself, one's attitudes, or one's behavior could produce tendencies to view the self focally. Knowledge of this kind usually serves as the central manipulation in studies of self-presentation.

2. DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENTS OF SELF-PRESENTATION

On encountering specific others or groups, a person's typical reaction is to focalize and evaluate them. But under certain conditions, this usual

tendency is set aside and the person turns instead to a focal awareness of self with the specific social entity in a tacit position. This perspective on self would be taken when (a) the specific social entity is perceived as relevant to the well-being of the tacit self; (b) the specific entity's attention is or could be directed toward the self, the self's attitudes, or the self's behavior; (c) the specific social entity is seen as likely to evaluate the self as a person; and (d) self-regulation in accord with the interests of the specific entity could lead to the gratification of the tacit self. When these conditions are met and the person enters this form of awareness, self-evaluation will ensue in accord with dimensions derived from the perceived interests of the tacit social entity.

Now, in many cases of the presentation of self to others, one knows very little about what specific interests the others may have. The "best guess" in these cases would be to evaluate self on the basis of simple "personhood," opting then for a standard of equity. When this happens, there is little reason to differentiate this awareness form from focal self awareness through the tacit self. It is only when the tacit specific other's interests or desires are seen to deviate from a contribution or equity rule that it becomes particularly useful to speak of self-presentation or impression management. With very few exceptions, however, the past literature on these processes has failed to offer experimental subjects any special information about the concerns of those to whom their self-presentations will be made. As a rule, subjects are led to believe that their responses or self-reports in an experiment will either be *public* or *private*. In some studies, this variation has been achieved by giving subjects to understand that their responses would be monitored by someone (public) or not observed by anyone (private). In others, the "bogus pipeline" technique of Jones and Sigall (1971) has been used to accomplish a similar variation; some subjects' responses are simply recorded on a questionnaire (public), whereas others' responses are recorded while their physiological processes are ostensibly being checked by means of a "lie detector" (private). Presumably, the subject in this latter condition is motivated to report private or "true" responses by the possibility that deviations from these will be known by the polygraph operator. With both forms of the public-private manipulation, then, public conditions mean public to the experimenter, and subjects are left to guess what the experimenter's interests might be.

Under these conditions, subjects are presenting themselves to a specific other whose justice preferences are unknown. With this understanding in mind, it is possible to inspect the self-presentation literature with a particular expectation: Subjects in public conditions should adhere more closely to equity—the tacit self system's rule for focal self-evaluation. With measures ranging from self-reported guilt and unhap-

piness (Rivera & Tedeschi, 1976) to task performance and perceived task difficulty (Morse, Gruzen, & Reis, 1976) to reward allocation preference (Reis & Gruzen, 1976), this is exactly what has been found. Like the focal self awareness induced by a mirror, focal self awareness induced through the tacit awareness of specific others whose justice preferences are unknown leads to greater acceptance of the standard of equity.

It should be noted that the experiment by Reis and Gruzen (1976) included a condition in which subjects' allocations were to be made public to someone other than the experimenter—the group of coworkers to whom the subject was allocating funds. Here, an equality rule was followed. The appearance of this allocation tactic when one is made aware of one's membership in a group signals an important possibility that is considered in detail in the next section.

IV AWARENESS OF THE GROUP

Because the idea of a group can exist in the minds of individuals, and because a group so conceptualized seems to have properties of human agency resembling those of an individual (Campbell, 1958; Heider, 1958), forms of group awareness can occur. One may be tacitly aware of a group, evaluating its situation in focal awareness with the group's common interest in view; or, one may be focally aware of a group, evaluating it with reference to the self's tacit system. These forms of awareness may be assumed with or without group membership. The groups of which one is aware in these ways need only be assemblies of individuals that are present in one's immediate environment, that are held in memory as a unit, or that are expected to operate as a single entity in the future.

A. Implications of Group Awareness

Since 1902, when Cooley supplied the label of "we-feeling" for the awareness that individuals may have of their group, a variety of theoretical perspectives have arisen that examine the individual's mental representation of groups (e.g., Schutz, 1967; Wilder, 1977, 1978). Paralleling this development, and beginning with the identification of "ethnocentrism" by Sumner (1906), several theories have also suggested that individuals may take different perspectives on groups—largely as a function of whether the individuals are group members or not (Holzner, 1978). The present analysis, guided in part by the formulation of Pennebaker, McElrea, and Skelton (1979), combines these two strains of theory by

suggesting that the individual's perception of a group may be represented in terms of the tacit-focal function.

The implications of this idea can be explored in two domains. First, there are a number of ways in which the forms of group awareness may be helpful in conceptualizing an individual's perceptions of what is just or fair for the group as a unit. Second, because an individual's focal awareness has only limited capacity (Shallice, 1978) and hence may not accommodate both a group and its individual members at once, group awareness has important implications for the individual's perceptions of what is just within the group. These two sets of implications are taken up in turn in this section.

1. JUSTICE FOR THE GROUP

Predictions about the influence of group awareness forms on an individual's perceptions of what the group deserves follow in a fairly straightforward way from an application of the tacit-focal function. Whether the individual is engaged as group member, or is merely watching from the outside, an initial requisite is that the group be seen as a unitary social entity. This first step may follow on perceptions of inter-member proximity, similarity, or attraction (Heider, 1958), may accrue from knowledge of the group's common agency or common fate (Campbell, 1958; Holzner, 1978), may be produced by the perceptual salience of the particular grouping (McArthur & Post, 1977), or may arise from any number of other variables that have the effect of introducing a social categorization (see, e.g., Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969). Groups comprehended as units may then be held in either tacit or focal awareness.

Tacit group awareness results in "identification" with the group and concern for its interests. The group's needs are used as a guide in evaluating the group's situation, and as noted earlier (Section III. C. 2.), the tacitly known group could provide standards for the evaluation of the focal self. More generally, though, it can be argued that this awareness form should produce effects on the individual by operating much as "reference groups" have been held to operate (see Merton & Kitt, 1950), orienting the individual toward group goals. Focal group awareness, in contrast, should lead the individual to conceptualize the group and to evaluate it in terms of its fairness in exchanges with other entities. The formation of a group stereotype and the development of prejudice, in this light, are processes that occur when a group is held in focal awareness and is seen as having some unfair advantage or disadvantage in exchange.

Concepts of group awareness are also helpful in understanding how

attentional processes may guide group perception and behavior. Although in well-defined groups it is probably true that individuals most often hold their own group in tacit awareness and other groups in focal awareness, certain principles of attention could override this tendency. The figure-ground principle of Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1935), for example, suggests that smaller entities are seen as figural or focal against the ground of larger entities. Smaller groups, therefore, may often be given focal awareness, whereas larger groups are not (see Duval & Siegel, 1978; Wegner & Schaefer, 1978). As a consequence, extreme evaluations of minority groups are more likely to be developed, both by members and nonmembers. Because the majority is seldom lent focal awareness, its adherence to fairness in exchange goes largely unchecked.

2. JUSTICE FOR THE GROUP MEMBER

An important set of predictions about justice within a group becomes apparent on considering the potential conflict between focal group awareness and focal awareness of individuals within the group. When a group member is focally aware of the group as a whole, the limited scope of focal consciousness precludes the possibility that the member will be able to hold self or any other particular member in focal awareness at the same time. This idea is compatible with theories of deindividuation that argue that an awareness of individuals is attenuated by group membership (Diener, 1979; Zimbardo, 1969), and is also consistent with Wilder's (1978) research showing reductions in responsibility attribution to individuals who are members of groups. The notion has been tested most directly, however, in an innovative study by Pennebaker, McElrea, and Skelton (1979). These researchers arranged for small groups of three or four previously unacquainted subjects to be made focally aware of their status as a social entity; each group met facing a large mirror in which all the members could be seen. When these subjects were asked to indicate their personal responsibility for a series of hypothetical events, they accepted less responsibility than did subjects who met in groups without the mirror. Individual subjects asked these questions in mirror and no-mirror conditions, however, replicated the earlier finding of Duval and Wicklund (1973); focal self awareness induced by the mirror increased subjects' acceptance of personal responsibility.

The reduction of personal responsibility felt by group members who are focally group aware may have an especially interesting consequence—a reduction in the concern for equity within the group. Because the focal awareness and evaluation of any individual group member is prevented, an *equality rule* is likely to prevail as the chosen allocation tactic. Such a rule should emerge as the “default option” in

this case because it is the only adequate way to solve the problem of resource distribution when differentiation among recipients is impossible. The frequent appearance of equal distribution in cases when individuals anticipate interaction (e.g., Shapiro, 1975), are motivated to achieve group cohesiveness (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1979), or are unconcerned with fostering individual productivity (see Deutsch, 1975) can be explained with reference to group awareness in this way. In each of these circumstances, individual group members are focalizing the group as a unitary entity. This form of awareness places a strict limitation on the extent to which individual group members can be identified, differentiated, and ascribed portions of responsibility for a group product. Focal group awareness, then, acts as an opaque window through which only equality can be seen.

Focal group awareness may also be a *goal* of individuals, and this might affect internal reward allocation as well. Just as a person who has achieved some special success may approach self-focusing stimuli to experience the positive self-evaluation more deeply (Wicklund, 1975), individuals in particularly successful groups might try to maintain focal group awareness. Because any deviation from equality would have the effect of identifying individual members and interfering with focal group awareness, it would be expected that such successful groups would prefer equality quite strongly. Groups that have some failure or negative characteristic to dwell on in focal group awareness, in turn, should be inclined to avoid equality and instead single out individual members through equitable treatment. This analysis adds an interesting footnote to the recently burgeoning literature on equity within close relationships (e.g., Hatfield, Utne, & Traupman, 1979); to wit, when equity is an important issue in a close relationship, the relationship may not be that close after all. The avoidance of focal group awareness signaled by a concern for equity suggests that the group is evaluated negatively by its members.

B. Experimental Demonstrations

In contrast to the ideas of self awareness and other awareness, the concept of group awareness is not traceable to any large body of contemporary research in social psychology. For this reason, and because experiments on group awareness reveal the generality of the present analysis of awareness states in a way that other investigations do not, two experiments involving group awareness and justice by Giuliano and Wegner (1981) are presented in some detail here.

1. GIULIANO AND WEGNER (1981): EXPERIMENT 1

This study was designed as a preliminary test of the idea that focal group awareness produces adherence to an equality rule in allocations that are made within the group. The use of a paradigm similar to that of Pennebaker *et al.* (1979) made a test of the idea that focal self-awareness results in equity feasible as well. Subjects of both sexes were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (partner present versus partner absent) × 2 (mirror present versus mirror absent) design. In all cases, subjects were told that they would be working on an individual task for 30 min, that their partner (another subject) would be working on a similar task for 1 hr, and that they would be paid at the end of the session. Subjects completed the 30 min of work under one of the four conditions, and then were taken aside and asked to divide \$3 in quarters as payment for themselves and their partners (who ostensibly continued working for the full 1 hr).

Focal self awareness was expected to be aroused in the partner absent-mirror present condition, as this is the usual manipulation of self-focus used in the Duval and Wicklund (1972) tradition. Focal group awareness was anticipated as a result of the partner present-mirror present condition; like the manipulation successfully employed by Pennebaker *et al.* (1979), the room arrangement in this condition allowed each subject to see both self and other in a large mirror placed on a table before them. The partner absent-mirror absent condition served as a comparison group in this design, as the arousal of neither focal self awareness nor focal group awareness was expected for subjects working alone without the mirror. Finally, a partner present-mirror absent condition was included to find out whether partner presence alone would produce effects more like those of self awareness or group awareness.

The amount of the \$3 payment the subjects allocated to themselves under these conditions is shown in Table 3.2; it should be noted that a self-allocation of \$1 would be an equitable response here, as subjects ostensibly worked for half the time that their partners did. In an analysis of variance, neither main effect was significant. Partner presence and mirror presence did not have the simple additive effect on adherence to equity that might be predicted on the basis of an "increased strength of self-focus" hypothesis. Instead, the interaction of partner presence and mirror presence was significant ($p < .02$); although the relevant individual comparisons did not all reach standard levels of significance, the discernible trend is for greater adherence to equity with either mirror or partner present. When both are present, and subjects can become focally aware of the dyad, greater self-allocation is the result.

Table 3.2
Self-Allocation as
Partner Presence^a

	Mirror Present	
	Mirror presence	
Absent	48 (10)	23 (11)
Present	07 (10)	36 (11)

^a Main entries
number of subject

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The increase in self-allocation under focal group awareness conditions in this study might be interpreted in two ways. An explanation that might well be proposed by deindividuation theorists such as Diener (1979) or Zimbardo (1969) would be that the awareness of one's group membership acts as a simple releaser of self-interest. The present analysis, in contrast, suggests a different alternative. In this view, the enhanced self-allocation in the comparison condition (partner absent-mirror absent) may indeed reflect self-interest, as it is likely that tacit self-awareness was predominant for subjects under such circumstances. But the higher self-allocation in the focal group awareness condition is interpretable as a movement toward equality. A decision on the relative validity of these interpretations cannot be made given the arrangements of this study. So, although these results signal the importance of a distinction between self-focus and group-focus, they are not conclusive regarding the differential impact of these states on distribution tactics.

2. GIULIANO AND WEGNER (1981): EXPERIMENT 2

This study was designed to provide more complete information on the justice preferences of individuals in states of focal self awareness and focal group awareness, and also to explore the operation of some new manipulations of these states. The basic paradigm was straightforward: After one subject had worked alone for 25 min, he or she was joined at a table by another subject; the two proceeded to work individually for 25 min on questionnaires designed to assess their levels of focal self awareness and focal group awareness, and then were given individual forms on which they were to indicate how the payment of \$4.20 for the two of them should be divided. Forty-seven subjects of both sexes participated under these conditions, several of whom were tested with confederate

partners when their subject partners failed to arrive. Of the total sample, 24 participated in the low-input condition (25 min) and 23 participated in the high input condition (50 min).

Two questionnaires were used to assess subjects' social awareness in the experimental setting. One of these consisted of five responsibility attribution items modeled after those of Duval and Wicklund (1973); in contrast to the Duval and Wicklund procedure, however, which called for the subject to consider a hypothetical incident (e.g., an auto accident) and to assign a percentage of responsibility to self versus other, the present items allowed subjects to assign responsibility to self, other or *group* (both self and other). It was expected that self-attribution of responsibility would serve as a measure of focal self awareness, whereas attribution of responsibility to the group would tap focal group awareness. Self-responsibility and group-responsibility indices were computed, therefore, as the sums of a subject's responses of each type for the five items.

The second questionnaire was developed as an extension of the work of Davis and Brock (1975); these researchers found that mirror subjects asked to guess pronouns in foreign language prose more often guessed *I* and *me* than did no-mirror subjects. For the present measure, then, subjects were given a set of 30 English sentences with a pronoun missing in each (cf. Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). A set of three plausible alternative pronouns was provided for each blank, one a first person singular (*I*, *me*, *my*), one a first person plural (*we*, *us*, *our*), and one a third person singular or plural (*he*, *she*, *they*, *him*, *her*, *them*, *his*, *hers*, *theirs*). When subjects chose pronouns under the instruction that the questionnaire was planned to assess "ambiguity and redundancy in language," it was expected that the number of first person singular choices and the number of first person plural choices would reflect, respectively, the predominance of thoughts about self and about group in focal awareness. Thus, self-pronoun and group-pronoun indices were computed as the sum of these respective choices for each subject.

Correlations among the four indices of self-awareness and group awareness are shown in Table 3.3. Because these indices show a reasonable level of reliability and convergent and divergent validity for measures in this initial stage of development, self-total and group-total indices were formed by summation of the standardized responsibility and pronoun measures for each subject; correlations with these measures are also shown in Table 3.3. Unfortunately, because self versus group choices were ipsative in both the pronoun and attribution measures, it is not clear whether the actual relationship between focal self awareness and focal group awareness is the strongly negative one suggested by the

Table 3.3
Correlations among Awareness Measures

Awareness measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Self-pronoun	(.64)				
2. Self-responsibility	.17	(.55)			
3. Self-total	.76	.77			
4. Group-pronoun	-.69	-.18	-.57	(.60)	
5. Group-responsibility	-.15	-.80	-.62	.16	(.68)
6. Group-total	-.56	-.63	-.78	.77	.76

Source: From Giuliano and Wegner (1981), Experiment 2.

^a Parenthetical entries in diagonal are interitem reliabilities; $N = 4$

-.78 correlation between the totals. This possibility should be kept in mind, however, in interpreting the subsequent analyses.

Table 3.4 displays mean self-allocations for the high and low input conditions when subjects are partitioned in two different ways. Analysis of variance on the upper half of the table revealed a significant interaction of focal self awareness (as assessed by a median split of subjects on the self-total index) and input ($p < .02$). The significant simple main effect of input for subjects high in focal self awareness ($p < .05$) indicates that this awareness form sensitized subjects to the input difference; greater reward was allocated to self when self made a larger contribution of time. For subjects low in focal self awareness, the simple main effect of input was not significant (or in the direction of equity).

When subjects are partitioned according to input and focal group

Table 3.4
Self-Allocation as a Function of Awareness Indices and Input^a

Awareness score	Input	
	High	Low
<i>Self-total index of focal self awareness</i>		
High	2.28 (10)	1.83 (13)
Low	2.18 (13)	2.29 (11)
<i>Group-total index of focal group awareness</i>		
High	2.13 (14)	2.29 (9)
Low	2.37 (9)	1.89 (15)

Source: From Giuliano and Wegner (1981), Experiment 2.

^a Main entries represent means in dollars; parenthetical entries indicate subjects in group.

awareness as shown in the lower half of Table 3.4, analysis of variance also indicated a significant interaction ($p < .01$). Here, a significant simple main effect for input exists only for subjects low in group awareness ($p < .01$); these subjects adhere to equity, whereas those high in group awareness show only a small difference between input conditions in a direction opposite that of equity. This striking disparity in the effects of group awareness versus self-awareness on allocation decisions is reflected as well in subjects' responses to a postexperimental questionnaire. Ratings of the importance of one's own time worked and partner's time worked to the allocation decision were positively correlated with focal self awareness measures but negatively correlated with focal group awareness measures.

The summary implications of these findings are twofold. First, as suggested by the justice propositions derived from the tacit-focal function, and as previously demonstrated in several other studies (see Section III: B. 2), focal self awareness leads individuals to allocate resources in line with the dictates of equity. This connection appeared in both of the present experiments, and so substantiates the tacit-focal analysis of self awareness phenomena. The second general conclusion to be drawn from this research is that focal group awareness leads individuals to distribute rewards equally within the group. Whereas the first experiment showed that focal group awareness releases individuals from the constraints of equity to pursue another allocation strategy, the second experiment revealed that the strategy of choice in focal group awareness is equality. So, even though equality is not explicitly represented as an allocation option in the basic justice derivations from the tacit-focal function, its presence can be interpreted in terms of social entity awareness nonetheless. By interfering with the individual's appreciation of separate group members' inputs, focal group awareness serves as an antecedent of equal distribution within the group.

V. CONCLUSIONS

When any fairly compact explanatory system is imposed on a preexisting body of knowledge, there is bound to be some strain. The present analysis, in showing how several major patterns of distributive justice (self-interest, equity, equality, and need) can be counted as consequences of a single principle (the tacit-focal function), may be particularly strenuous in this regard. As a way of easing this strain, it is helpful to conduct two quite different concluding exercises. First, a workable understanding of this system can be promoted by means of a general

example. Second, an appreciation of the future directions of this line of inquiry can be achieved through the consideration of emerging questions.

A. A General Example

Suppose that three diners conclude their meal and are given a single check by the waiter. Diner A has partaken of a modest meal, Diner B has enjoyed a feast complete with several drinks served in coconuts with little umbrellas, and Diner C has contented himself with a cup of tea and a bun. Suppose further that it is incumbent on Diner A to assemble the payment for the meal. Now, if for whatever situational or dispositional reasons, Diner A were to assume each of the six major awareness forms in turn, what method of payment might he propose in each case?

In tacit self awareness, Diner A would be cheap. He might be inclined to wander away from the table, to wait for B or C to pick up the tab, or at best, to round his contribution down as far as possible. Given focal self awareness, in contrast, Diner A would be equitable. To be sure, he would insist on paying his share of the check exactly. He might also prefer equity in payments from B and C, asking B to contribute more to pay for the more substantial meal, and C to give less for his snack.⁴ Given tacit other awareness of Diner B, A, as allocator, should be responsive to B's remarkable need for food, perhaps then "treating" him to the meal; similarly, tacit other awareness of Diner C could lead to a "treat" for him. Focal other awareness of B might make A particularly concerned with squeezing the correct large payment from him, while focal awareness of C should move A to make sure that C pays his correct small portion. Note that in these cases, A's tacit or focal awareness of a particular other has no necessary implication for justice among those of whom A is unaware.

The impact of the forms of group awareness on bill settling in this dining party would be determined by which particular diners comprised the group of which A was aware. Tacit group awareness of the entire group might lead A to suggest that they all skip the bill or at least stiff the waiter. Focal group awareness of the entire group, in turn, would lead A to call for equal payments from himself, B, and C; in addition, he might be concerned about the overall equity of the exchange between his

⁴This prediction is not firm, however. Although the justice propositions do suggest that equity should be followed in all transactions during focal self awareness, and although the research reviewed indicates that this is clearly the case in constant-sum allocations between self and one other person, studies have yet to be conducted showing how self-focus affects distribution among several others.

group and the restaurant. Should A become tacitly aware of a specific subgroup—say, B and C, or himself and C—then the needs of this subgroup would be emphasized at the expense of the other diner and perhaps the restaurant. And, if A were to become focally aware of such a subgroup, then the amount owed in common by the subgroup would be of prime interest.

This set of six awareness forms, then, certainly allows for a complex array of perceptions of what a just response to the dinner check might be. And, when it is recognized that several combining forms (e.g., A's tacit awareness of B during focal awareness of A and C) have their own additional implications for justice perceptions and behaviors, it becomes evident that there exists in this system sufficient complexity to account for even the most dazzling and apparently chaotic of natural allocation configurations. That this complexity can be reduced to the six elemental forms of social awareness, which in turn can be traced to a single cognitive rule about tacit and focal awareness, suggests that the study of justice as a system of social cognition may be quite useful.

B. Emerging Questions

In looking past this analysis to the aspects of social awareness that may be of future interest, several themes become prominent. At the outset, of course, it seems necessary to gather evidence on several of the basic connections between awareness forms and justice. In this chapter, a number of these connections were made on the basis of reinterpretations of research conducted by other investigators for other purposes, and some of the connections were suggested as theoretical conjectures alone. In service of plugging these holes, it seems that a more adequate and integrated understanding of techniques whereby awareness forms can be manipulated and measured is a necessary condition.

Another theme arising from this framework involves the motivational properties of the different awareness forms. It can be argued, for example, that both tacit and focal self awareness have a strong impact on the behavior of the individual; this is the message conveyed by Duval and Wicklund (1972). But to what degree do other awareness forms share this immediacy and activation potential? It seems that the forms of group awareness, for example, might be particularly likely to involve the individual in the same way that the forms of self awareness do—when the individual is a member of the group. Unlike other awareness, or the group awareness that occurs when one is not a member, awareness of one's own group would seem to be more personally and behaviorally relevant. Instead of detachment and cool calculation, this awareness

form might engender affective and motivational reactions like those engaged by the awareness of self. The immediacy of awareness forms to behavior production systems, then, is another important area for study.

A third theme embedded in this analysis is the problem of meta-awareness. Is it possible for individuals regularly to know or to control their own states of social entity awareness? Although the successful use of simple instructional sets to vary subjects' forms of other awareness suggests that meta-awareness of these states is child's play, the finding that individuals cannot usually report their own level of self awareness (Wicklund, 1975) indicates otherwise. Because such meta-awareness could prove to be an essential tool in the enterprise of moral education, questions such as these need to be raised and answered.

A final theme of interest is the question of the transformation of knowledge structures that occurs when these structures are moved between tacit and focal awareness. An observer may judge a person to be "greedy," for example, when the person is in focal awareness; when the observer later becomes tacitly aware of the person (for whatever reason), does the earlier attribution of greed lead the observer to become extraordinarily attuned to the satisfaction of the person's needs? In a larger context, this question is one of the formation and interactive development of the tacit system and focal consciousness. Satisfactory answers to such questions would do much to further the understanding of the role of cognition in justice and social life.

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